Chaing Kai-shek expresses his viewpoint on the chinese civil war from his perspective. He expresses his distain and resentment toward not only the communists but also the so-called "backstabbing" soviets.
Just as World War II ended, the remaining Japanese forces that occupied Manchuria were strictly ordered by the United States to surrender to my troops, the Kuomintang, and myself, but to resist the dirty communists who had already dominated the countryside. I knew they were planning a takeover of the government, and as such I could not let them obtain such valuable cities as Manchuria, whose industrial base was worth up to 2 billion dollars.
When the Soviet forces launched the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, which proved successful and consequently forced the 700,000 Japanese troops stationed in the region to surrender, I knew that unless I took immediate action, my lack of resources would allow Mao and the communists to conquer the land. So, in a desperate yet clever way to conserve the land of Manchuria for our nationalist forces, I constructed the Sino-Soviet peace treaty. This was a deal with the Russians to delay their withdrawal of Manchuria and other northern provinces until I had moved enough of my best-trained men, resources and materials and modern weaponry into the region. My troops were then assisted by the United States, and flown to occupy key cities, like Manchuria in northern China. “…therefore, using the enemy as a garrison until [they] could airlift [my] Chinese National troops to South China and send Marines to guard the seaports." More than 50,000 Marines were sent to guard strategic sites. The Soviets cleverly spent the extra time spasmodically dismantling the massive Manchurian industrial base and shipping it back to their war-damaged country.
The first peace meeting that was held following the Great War was in Chongquig from August 28, 1945 to Oct 10, 1945. As I desperately attempted to stress the importance of peace, Mao continued to launch propaganda campaign against me and thus I would launch some campaigns in return. Although no full-scale confrontations occurred through these meetings, the bad blood and tension between our forces rose tremendously. The flimsy truce fell apart in June 1946, when a full scale war between Mao’s communist troops and my nationalist troops erupted.
The United States generously assisted our troops with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of new and advanced surplus, western military supplies and military equipment. They offered air technologies to lift our troops from central China to the Northern Provinces, mainly Manchuria. President Truman was very kind for assisting and aiding us in the beginning of the war and although it pains me to say, I know he is right. I was perfectly clear to him that if he told the Japanese to lay down their arms immediately and march to the seaboard, the entire country would be annexed by the Communists.
Although we had the advantage of the United States, the communists were able to obtain a large number of weapons abandoned by the Japanese, including some tanks. They were not able to put any of these weapons to use, though, until I was abandoned by some of my troops who joined the communists and taught them how they were used. But despite this new military advance, the Communist’s ultimate winning “card” was its land reform policy. The land reform policy was a sneaky way for the communists to gain large masses of popularity and followers. As they traveled the Chinese countryside, they continued to make the irresistible promise to the innumerable landless and starving Chinese peasants that by fighting for the communists, they would be able to take farmland from their landlords. Although these untrained fighters died quickly, due to lack of experience, this enabled the communists to access an almost unlimited supply of manpower to use in combat as well as provide logistic support. During just one campaign alone, the communists could obtains thousands and thousands of willing peasants.
I first began to notice the downfall of my nationalist troops when the Soviet Forces led by General Malinovsky turned their back on me by secretly telling the communist forces to move in behind them as they evacuted the land, because Stalin wanted Mao to have firm control of at least the northern part of Manchuria before the complete withdrawal of the Soviets. In March 1946, despite my continuous requests to stop such sneaky behavior, a war broke out between my own forces and the communists over the occupation of Manchuria.
In March 1947, the KMT achieved a seemingly symbolic victory by seizing the communist capital of Yan’an. But this meant little to nothing because by the late 1948, Mao’s troops captured the northern cities of Shenyang and Changchun and seized control of the Northeast. The New First Army, which was easily my best, had to surrender after the deadly communists conducted a 6-month siege of Changchun that resulted in more than 300,000 civilian deaths from starvation. How no peasants and communist saw the evil they possessed is remarkable. The capture of my troops provided the communists with the tanks, heavy artillery, and other combined-arms assets needed to execute more deadly offensives.
The Huaihai Campaign of late 1948 and early 1949 secured east-central China for the CPC. Throughout this campaign, the manipulative communists under Mao’s rule were able to mobilize 5,430,000 peasants to fight against our nationalist forces. The Beiping-Tianjin Campaign resulted in the Communist conquest of northern China, lasting 64 days from November 21, 1948 to January 31, 1949.[46] All these campaigns were overpowering to us. The communists would arrive to battle with some 890,000 troops to match up with our about 600,000 troops. Out of self defense, we fought fiercely, causing about 40,000 communist casualties at Zhangjiakou. In turn, the spiteful communists killed, wounded or captured about 520,000 of my men.
On April 21, Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River, capturing Nanjing, capital of the Republic of China. In most cases, the surrounding countryside and small towns had come under Communist influence long before the cities. By late 1949, the People's Liberation Army was pursuing remains of my forces southwards in southern China. We were left with no choice but to retreat from Nanjing on April 23 successively to Canton (Guangzhou) until October 15, Chongqing until November 25, and Chengdu before retreating to Taipei on December 10. This marked the end of the civil war and the end of all prosperity in China as I knew it.
When the Soviet forces launched the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, which proved successful and consequently forced the 700,000 Japanese troops stationed in the region to surrender, I knew that unless I took immediate action, my lack of resources would allow Mao and the communists to conquer the land. So, in a desperate yet clever way to conserve the land of Manchuria for our nationalist forces, I constructed the Sino-Soviet peace treaty. This was a deal with the Russians to delay their withdrawal of Manchuria and other northern provinces until I had moved enough of my best-trained men, resources and materials and modern weaponry into the region. My troops were then assisted by the United States, and flown to occupy key cities, like Manchuria in northern China. “…therefore, using the enemy as a garrison until [they] could airlift [my] Chinese National troops to South China and send Marines to guard the seaports." More than 50,000 Marines were sent to guard strategic sites. The Soviets cleverly spent the extra time spasmodically dismantling the massive Manchurian industrial base and shipping it back to their war-damaged country.
The first peace meeting that was held following the Great War was in Chongquig from August 28, 1945 to Oct 10, 1945. As I desperately attempted to stress the importance of peace, Mao continued to launch propaganda campaign against me and thus I would launch some campaigns in return. Although no full-scale confrontations occurred through these meetings, the bad blood and tension between our forces rose tremendously. The flimsy truce fell apart in June 1946, when a full scale war between Mao’s communist troops and my nationalist troops erupted.
The United States generously assisted our troops with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of new and advanced surplus, western military supplies and military equipment. They offered air technologies to lift our troops from central China to the Northern Provinces, mainly Manchuria. President Truman was very kind for assisting and aiding us in the beginning of the war and although it pains me to say, I know he is right. I was perfectly clear to him that if he told the Japanese to lay down their arms immediately and march to the seaboard, the entire country would be annexed by the Communists.
Although we had the advantage of the United States, the communists were able to obtain a large number of weapons abandoned by the Japanese, including some tanks. They were not able to put any of these weapons to use, though, until I was abandoned by some of my troops who joined the communists and taught them how they were used. But despite this new military advance, the Communist’s ultimate winning “card” was its land reform policy. The land reform policy was a sneaky way for the communists to gain large masses of popularity and followers. As they traveled the Chinese countryside, they continued to make the irresistible promise to the innumerable landless and starving Chinese peasants that by fighting for the communists, they would be able to take farmland from their landlords. Although these untrained fighters died quickly, due to lack of experience, this enabled the communists to access an almost unlimited supply of manpower to use in combat as well as provide logistic support. During just one campaign alone, the communists could obtains thousands and thousands of willing peasants.
I first began to notice the downfall of my nationalist troops when the Soviet Forces led by General Malinovsky turned their back on me by secretly telling the communist forces to move in behind them as they evacuted the land, because Stalin wanted Mao to have firm control of at least the northern part of Manchuria before the complete withdrawal of the Soviets. In March 1946, despite my continuous requests to stop such sneaky behavior, a war broke out between my own forces and the communists over the occupation of Manchuria.
In March 1947, the KMT achieved a seemingly symbolic victory by seizing the communist capital of Yan’an. But this meant little to nothing because by the late 1948, Mao’s troops captured the northern cities of Shenyang and Changchun and seized control of the Northeast. The New First Army, which was easily my best, had to surrender after the deadly communists conducted a 6-month siege of Changchun that resulted in more than 300,000 civilian deaths from starvation. How no peasants and communist saw the evil they possessed is remarkable. The capture of my troops provided the communists with the tanks, heavy artillery, and other combined-arms assets needed to execute more deadly offensives.
The Huaihai Campaign of late 1948 and early 1949 secured east-central China for the CPC. Throughout this campaign, the manipulative communists under Mao’s rule were able to mobilize 5,430,000 peasants to fight against our nationalist forces. The Beiping-Tianjin Campaign resulted in the Communist conquest of northern China, lasting 64 days from November 21, 1948 to January 31, 1949.[46] All these campaigns were overpowering to us. The communists would arrive to battle with some 890,000 troops to match up with our about 600,000 troops. Out of self defense, we fought fiercely, causing about 40,000 communist casualties at Zhangjiakou. In turn, the spiteful communists killed, wounded or captured about 520,000 of my men.
On April 21, Communist forces crossed the Yangtze River, capturing Nanjing, capital of the Republic of China. In most cases, the surrounding countryside and small towns had come under Communist influence long before the cities. By late 1949, the People's Liberation Army was pursuing remains of my forces southwards in southern China. We were left with no choice but to retreat from Nanjing on April 23 successively to Canton (Guangzhou) until October 15, Chongqing until November 25, and Chengdu before retreating to Taipei on December 10. This marked the end of the civil war and the end of all prosperity in China as I knew it.
Although I tried my very best to resist such manipulative and oppressive forces that of the communists, my dignified attempts failed and China is now in the hands of an agonizingly communist rule.
Chaing Kai-Shek
乍啟Chaing Kai-Shek
